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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant Steven M. Kramer is an attorney who 
represented The Industry Network System, Inc. and Elliot Fineman 
in the underlying litigation, an antitrust case against Armstrong 
World Industries.  After the first trial, in which his clients 
prevailed, Mr. Kramer ceased to represent both plaintiffs.1  The 
                     
1
.  There is a dispute between Kramer and his former clients 
whether he was discharged or withdrew.  The district court made 
no finding on this point, but the circumstances of how the 
relationship was severed are not significant to our decision.  
  
issues that culminate in this appeal arise from the severance of 
that relationship.  Kramer believes he is entitled to a lien to 
ensure that his fees will be paid and argues that the district 
court failed to recognize a lien.  He appeals from three orders 
of the district court: the order dated January 21, 1994, 
compelling Kramer to turn over his files to the substituted 
counsel; the order dated February 8, 1994, denying 
reconsideration of its January 21st order; and the order dated 
February 25, 1994, denying Kramer's February 16, 1994 motion for 
an attorney's lien pursuant to New Jersey statutory law.  These 
matters are now before us for review pursuant to the appellant's 
notice of appeal filed March 7, 1994.2  Kramer represented 
himself in the district court and does so again before us.  We 
will affirm. 
 Kramer sets forth three issues in his opening brief to 
this court:  (1) whether the district court refused to recognize 
an attorney's lien, to which Kramer contends he is entitled for 
defending his client from counterclaims, and erred for holding 
him in contempt when he refused to surrender his files to 
substituted counsel; (2) whether the district court should have 
insisted that Kramer be paid before new counsel replaced him; and 
                     
2
.  Kramer also filed another handwritten, nonetheless legible 
notice of appeal on March 30, 1994 in which he appealed "the 
orders of March 30, 1994, holding him in contempt, denying 
emergency stay, and the January 21st and February 25th orders, 
and the orders denying recusal and all related orders."  Since he 
fails to pursue the stay order, it is abandoned.  The balance of 
the issues in the handwritten "notice of appeal" are subsumed in 
the earlier notice of appeal. 
  
(3) whether the district judge should be disqualified from 
hearing any matter concerning him.3  We note that, to the extent 
Kramer raised other issues in the text of his briefs to this 
court, but failed to first raise them in the  "Statement of 
Issues" section of his opening brief, those issues are waived.  
In Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that 
if an appellant lists an issue in his "Statement of Issues" and 
thereafter fails to pursue it in the "Argument" portion, we 
consider it abandoned.  Likewise, if he fails to raise an issue 
in his "Statement of Issues," but argues the point in the body of 
his brief, we will consider it waived.  See also Lunderstadt v. 
Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(3) and (5), which require appellant's brief to contain a 
"statement of issues presented for review" and, in its argument, 
"the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented"); 16 
Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3974, at 421 
(1977 & Supp. 1994, at 690) (issues must be raised in both the 
"Issues" and the "Argument" sections of the brief); accord Kost 
v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182-83 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1992).   
I. 
 The underlying case was filed by Network and Elliot 
Fineman, Network's majority shareholder, against Armstrong, 
                     
3
.  We note that, to the extent Kramer argues issues in the text 
of his brief, other than those first raised in the "Statement of 
Issues," under the circumstances of this case, we will exercise 
our discretion to treat these matters as waived.  See Nagle v. 
Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) and Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(3), (a)(6). 
  
alleging antitrust, tortious interference and breach of contract 
claims.  After a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the 
district court granted Armstrong's motions for JNOV and for a new 
trial.  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 774 F.Supp. 225 
(D.N.J. 1991).  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 
171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993).  In the 
second trial, the jury awarded no damages to Network.  This 
verdict has been appealed and is now pending before another panel 
of this court.     
 Kramer ceased to represent Fineman and Network between 
the first and second trials.  Kramer refused, however, to turn 
his files over to Network's new attorneys.  After Network sought 
an order compelling Kramer to relinquish the files, Kramer moved 
to recuse the trial judge, and, in a separate motion Kramer 
requested, inter alia, that, before he relinquish his files, 
Network be required to post a bond to guarantee payment for his 
services.   The district court ordered Kramer to relinquish his 
files, allowed Network to substitute new counsel but did not 
require that Network post a bond or pay Kramer.  Industry Network 
System, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 84-3837 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 21, 1994) (unpublished order).  Later, the district court 
denied Kramer's motion to recuse.  Industry Network System, Inc. 
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 84-3837 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 
1994) (unpublished opinion). 
 Kramer then filed a motion contending that he was 
entitled to a statutory attorney's lien for work done defending 
the plaintiffs from Armstrong's counterclaims.  The district 
  
court also denied this motion.  Industry Network System, Inc. v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 84-3837 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 1994) 
(unpublished opinion).  Following an order by the district court 
holding Kramer in contempt of its orders requiring him to 
relinquish his files, Kramer obeyed.    
II. 
A. Attorney's Lien 
 Kramer claims that defending Network against 
Armstrong's counterclaims entitles him to a fee and a lien to 
secure payment of it.  He avers that all predicates to his claim 
are satisfied because his fee is not contingent upon Network's 
success in its antitrust case against Armstrong, and hence the 
jury's verdict for Network on the counterclaims, which was not 
contested on appeal, is for all purposes final.  We conclude that 
the issue is ripe for review but is without factual or legal 
support.  We will affirm. 
 The matters before us on appeal have been unduly 
complicated by appellant.  His theory on why he is entitled to a 
fee and an attorney's lien, for example, has been evolving 
throughout the proceedings, from a quantum meruit request for 
$3.2 million in fees to compensate him for an alleged 8,000 hours 
of work; to a retaining lien for his defense to counterclaims;4  
                     
4
.  Kramer states in his brief that he spent "seven years of work 
in successfully defending the multi-million dollar 
counterclaims."  He modified this contention downward at oral 
argument to "defending the $400,000 counter-claims."  Neither 
estimate, however, is material to our decision except to note the 
labile nature of Kramer's contentions. 
  
to a charging lien based upon the New Jersey Statutes Annotated 
(upon which he based the motion that the district court denied on 
February 25, 1994, which is one of the orders Kramer specified in 
his notice of appeal); to a fee based upon a bankruptcy order 
authorizing him to represent Fineman in bankruptcy; and at oral 
argument he contended for the first time that he is entitled to a 
lien under unspecified bankruptcy laws.  Throughout his 
arguments, Kramer seems to conflate the terms "fees" and "liens."  
They are two different matters.  With respect to a lien, we have 
before us on appeal only whether the district court adequately 
protected Kramer's retaining lien or erred by denying him a 
statutory charging lien.   
 It is axiomatic, of course, that Kramer must show that 
he is or will become entitled to a fee before he is entitled to a 
lien.  When pressed by the court at oral argument for the fee 
agreement or other basis entitling him to a fee for defending the 
counterclaims, Kramer referred the court to Supplemental Appendix 
page 29.  This, as the court then pointed out, is only an order 
denying him a fee and deeming the district court's referral of 
jurisdiction with respect to fees withdrawn.  Nevertheless, 
Kramer then argued that by authorizing the debtor-in-possession 
Fineman to employ him as his antitrust attorney, the bankruptcy 
court created the obligation to pay him a fee.   
 There are several problems with Kramer's contentions.  
First, Fineman, who was the debtor-in-possession, signed the 
Application only in his individual capacity, and any fee Kramer 
has earned is from the bankrupt estate for preserving its assets, 
  
not from the parties to the underlying litigation.5  Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, an attorney for a debtor-in-possession is 
entitled to be paid only in accordance with an agreement filed 
with the court.  11 U.S.C. § 328.  But the Code does not entitle 
the attorney to a lien -- and for good reason.  Section 503(b) of 
the Code allows reasonable compensation for an attorney as an 
administrative expense of the estate and § 507(a)(1) gives the 
expense priority.  A lien, however, is neither authorized by the 
Code nor necessary. 
 Second, Kramer's argument is disingenuous at best and 
deceptive at worst.  As debtor-in-possession, Fineman applied to 
the bankruptcy court with full knowledge of and assistance by 
Kramer, to have Kramer appointed "under the terms and conditions 
set forth in the annexed affidavit of proposed antitrust 
counsel."  Kramer, in his "Affidavit of Proposed Special Counsel 
for Debtor-in-Possession," which he submitted with the 
Application to the Bankruptcy Court, averred,  
 I have rendered to debtor professional services in 
 connection with the within action and in accordance 
 with a retainer agreement memorialized by letter 
 attached hereto as Exhibit A...In connection with this 
 retention I shall assist the Debtor-in-Possession in 
 resolving all issues in the [underlying litigation] and 
                     
5
.  Fineman withdrew from the litigation after the first trial, 
and is no longer a party. 
  
 shall try the case to conclusion or settlement as is 
 necessary.  
(emphasis added).  Moreover, Kramer concludes his affidavit, 
 I am unable to estimate the time for completion of   
 these services.  This case involves a prosecution of a 
 complex anti-trust case and inasmuch as my application 
 will be based on a contingency agreement set forth in 
 Exhibit A the amount of time necessary is not 
 applicable under these circumstances.   
  
(emphasis added).6 
 Kramer contends that his right to a fee, hence his 
right to a statutory lien, is for the "hours he spent."  Yet from 
his own sworn words, his fee is "based upon the contingency 
agreement set forth in Exhibit A."  This contingency agreement, 
which is signed by both Kramer and Elliot Fineman individually, 
provides that Kramer 
 shall receive 36% of any and all sums 
recovered, whether by settlement or judgment.  
Recovery shall be defined as all monies 
recovered, including damages, treble damages, 
and counsel fees paid by defendant pursuant 
to statute. 
 In sum, Kramer agreed to represent the debtor-in-
possession on "all issues" for a fee that was contingent upon 
Fineman's success in the antitrust case and not, as he has 
argued, based upon a hourly sum for time spent or in quantum 
                     
6
.  In the Appendix Kramer filed on appeal, he supplied the court 
with neither his Affidavit nor Elliot Fineman's Application.  
Inasmuch as Kramer's entire argument on appeal, by his own 
account, depends upon the bankruptcy court's order, it is 
difficult for the court to view Kramer's act of omitting these 
documents, so damaging to his argument and so critical to our 
review and decision, as other than deliberate. 
  
meruit.  Because Fineman recovered nothing, and indeed did not 
participate in the second trial, the condition precedent to 
Kramer's right to a fee -- a verdict in the antitrust case in 
Fineman's favor -- has not occurred, and the entire basis of 
Kramer's counterclaim lien theory collapses.  On this record he 
simply is not entitled to either a fee or a lien. 
 But Kramer is wrong in his other arguments as well.  He 
relies upon our decision in Novinger v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & 
Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 
(1987), in which we held that the district court was required to 
affirmatively protect an attorney's retaining lien before 
requiring that he relinquish his files.  His reliance, however, 
is misplaced because Novinger was decided under Pennsylvania law. 
 Under New Jersey law, as in Pennsylvania an attorney 
will lose a retaining lien by voluntarily relinquishing files to 
substituted counsel.  In New Jersey, however, an attorney will 
not lose the lien if the files are given to substituted counsel 
under compulsion of a court order.  In Frenkel v. Frenkel, 599 
A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991), counsel for plaintiff likewise 
refused to give case files to substituted counsel until his fees 
were paid by plaintiff.  The court held that a "conflict between 
the withdrawing attorney and the former client should not be 
allowed to delay the underlying action." Id. at 598.  It 
concluded that a withdrawing attorney's common law retaining lien 
"[was] not relinquished" when it obeyed the court's order to turn 
them over.  Id.; accord Brauer v. Hotel Assoc., Inc., 192 A.2d 
831, 835 (N.J. 1963).   
  
 The situation is no different here.   When Kramer was 
ordered by the court to relinquish his files, he had no choice 
but to do so.  His retaining lien was and is protected, as the 
district court explicitly recognized.  Industry Network, Inc., v. 
Armstrong, No. 84-3837, slip. op. at 10 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 1994) 
(unpublished opinion):  
 At issue today is not whether Mr. Kramer should 
 voluntarily turn over the files, thereby destroying his 
 retaining lien.  Rather, the issue is whether the court 
 should order Mr. Kramer to turn over the files 
 involuntarily, a step which would preserve Mr Kramer's 
 lien rights.   
Kramer unnecessarily exposed himself to contempt by his 
disobedience, and without any foundation in the law he appealed 
the surrender order.           
 Kramer also incorrectly asserts that the district court 
erred by denying his February 16, 1994 motion in which he 
requested a statutory charging lien for the work done defending 
the counterclaims.  First, the motion was entirely redundant 
because he was already protected by his common law retaining 
lien.   But, more fundamentally, he relied in his motion upon 
N.J.S.A. § 2A:13-5, which provides: 
 After the filing of a complaint or third-
party complaint or the service of a pleading 
containing a counterclaim or cross-claim, the 
attorney or counsellor at law, who shall 
appear in the cause for the party instituting 
the action or maintaining the third-party 
claim or counterclaim or cross-claim, shall 
have a lien for compensation, upon his 
client's action, cause of action, claim or 
  
counterclaim or cross-claim, which shall 
contain and attach to a verdict, report, 
decision, award, judgment or final order in 
his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof 
in whosesoever hands they may come.  
 
The district court held that this statute was limited on its face 
to attorneys who initiate claims and "confers no rights 
whatsoever upon an attorney in his capacity as the representative 
of a party successfully defending a claim of another party."  
Industry Network System, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
No. 84-3837, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished 
opinion).  We agree. 
  The plain language of N.J.S.A. § 2A:13-5 grants a lien 
to an attorney for affirmatively pursuing his client's "action, 
cause of action, claim or counterclaim or cross-claim."  Rather 
than providing a lien for all services performed by an attorney, 
the state legislature took pains to list those specific services 
to which the lien applies, but it did not include the defense to 
a defendant's counterclaims.  And Kramer has neither cited to us 
nor have we found any New Jersey case that interprets this 
statute otherwise.  At least one case, however, recognizes the 
plain language of the statute as a barrier to the same argument 
that Kramer now makes.  See Wilde v. Wilde, 184 A.2d 758 (N.J. 
Super. 1962) (questioning the propriety of defense counsel's 
claim that he should be entitled to a lien under § 2A:13-5 for 
successfully defending his client's title to property).  We 
decline to contravene the plain language of the statute and read 
new rights into it.   
  
 For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's 
order of January 21, 1994 and its order of February 8, 1994 




B. Substitution of Counsel 
 Kramer argues that New Jersey law required the district 
court to refuse substitution of new counsel for him in the 
underlying case until it required Network to pay him or to post a 
bond.  This argument, too, is without support.  Kramer relies 
only upon St. John the Baptist Greek Catholic Church v. Gengor, 2 
A.2d 337,  (N.J. Ch. 1938).  He contends that the district court 
"simply ignored that authority."  And that, "[h]ad it not done 
so, the orders in which appellant has been in contempt would 
never have been entered."  (Appellant's brief p. 27).   
 There are a number of problems with Kramer's 
contentions here as well.  First, as we have shown by his own 
sworn statement, he is not yet entitled to be paid a fee.  
Second, St. John does not support Kramer's position.  Indeed, the 
court in St. John said specifically that "the petition for 
substitution will not be granted until the liens have been 
satisfied."  Id. at 339 (emphasis added).  When Kramer was before 
the district court his right to a fee was not ripe, nor is it now 
because the primary contingency has not yet happened.  His 
retaining lien simply could not be satisfied when the district 
court ordered him to surrender his files because it could not 
  
then be quantified.  Inasmuch as we have held that the district 
court properly denied Kramer's petition for the lien he requested 
under N.J.S.A. § 2A:13-5, this argument fails as well.   
 Finally, New Jersey law contradicts Kramer's argument.  
Under Frenkel, Kramer is protected by his retaining lien.  Hence, 
should a court at some time determine that Kramer is entitled to 
a fee, "there has not been a voluntary surrender of possession 
which would extinguish [his] common law retaining lien.  On the 
contrary, the lien is not relinquished."  Id. at 598.  Kramer 
simply had no right to withhold the files as he did.  We conclude 
that the district court properly allowed substitution of counsel 
without ordering immediate payment of some arbitrary amount of 
fees or requiring that plaintiffs post bond.    
C. Recusal of Trial Judge  
 At oral argument Kramer limited his recusal request to 
matters dealing specifically with his right to fees.7  There is, 
however, no indication that Judge Bissell has any matter 
pertaining to Kramer's fee before him.  Therefore, Kramer's 
request that Judge Bissell recuse himself from hearing matters 
relating to fees is simply not ripe for review.  Should the 
conditions precedent to Kramer's fee occur, the matter would then 
still be in the first stage between him and his ex-client.  If 
                     
7
.  Kramer did not appeal from the district court's denial of his 
earlier motion for recusal, and we denied a petition by Kramer 
for a writ of mandamus to disqualify the trial judge from hearing 
any matter related to this case in which Kramer is involved.  
Industry Network System, Inc., v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc, 
No. 94-5183 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 1994) (unpublished order).  
  
his ex-client refuses to pay and Kramer believes he has a 
legitimate claim, he may opt to present the issue before a court.  
And to hypothesize further, if that issue should come before 
Judge Bissell; if Kramer still believes that Judge Bissell will 
not fairly adjudicate his claim and asks him to recuse; if Judge 
Bissell should refuse to recuse; and finally, if Kramer is 
dissatisfied with any fee order and elects to appeal that order, 
then he has an appealable order.  But the record reflects nothing 
of the sort now.  His appeal on this issue, as he has limited it, 
is premature.   
 III. 
   In sum, the issues before us, reduced to their essence, 
are whether the district court failed to protect Kramer's 
retaining lien; erred by denying Kramer a charging lien under the 
N.J.S.A.; and, whether the trial judge erred by not recusing 
himself from matters involving Kramer's entitlement to a fee.  
Inasmuch as we have determined that Kramer's retaining lien is 
protected by New Jersey common law, and that on this record he is 
entitled neither to a fee nor a statutory charging lien, we will 
affirm the district court's orders of January 21, February 15 and 
25, 1994, and its order holding him in contempt.  We will dismiss 
the appeal to the extent it challenges the district court's 
refusal to recuse.  
